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United States v. Sisson (D.Mass. 1969).

After two unsuccessful attempts to have the indictment
dismissed,' John Sisson, Jr., was found guilty of failing to comply
with the order of his local Selective Service Board to submit to
induction in the armed forces in violation of the Military Selective
Service Act of 1967.2 Sisson claimed that he was a conscientious
objector.3 However, that claim was not based upon "religious
training and belief" and was limited to objection to combat
service in Vietnam. On motion in arrest of judgment, Chief Judge
Wyzanski of the United States District Court, District of
Massachusetts, held, granted: (1) The statute invalidly
discriminated against Sisson by favoring religious objectors, and
tended to establish religion in contravention of the first and fifth
amendments; and, (2) The statute as written violated the first
amendment free exercise of religion clause and the fifth
amendment due process clause.4 United States v. Sisson, 297 F.
Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969).
I. United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 511 (D. Mass. 1968). Motion to dismiss
indictment denied-the court held that Sisson's contention that there was no constitutional
authority to conscript him to serve in an undeclared war presented a political question.
United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 515 (D. Mass. 1968). Motion to dismiss indictment
denied-the court held that Sisson's contention that he was being ordered to fight in
genocidal war presented a political question.
2. 50 U.S.C., App. § 462(a) (1964), as amended. (Supp. I1. 1968). Any person who
"evades or refuses registration or service in the armed forces . . .shall upon conviction
in any district court of the United States of competent jurisdiction, be punished by
imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not more than $10,000, or by both
such fine and imprisonment .. "
3. Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C.. App. § 4560) (1964), as amended.
(Supp. III, 1968). "Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person
to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States
who by reason of religious training and belief is conscientiously opposed to participation
in war in any form."
4. The United States Supreme Court has consented to hear the case. 38 U.S.L.W.
3113.
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. by reason of religious trainingand belief.

..

The foundation of the present conflict can be traced to the
Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1947.1 The 1965
case of United States v. Seeger' brought about a major change in
this Act. Seeger questioned the constitutionality of that Act
insofar as it defined "religious training and belief," as:
an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being
involving duties superior to those arising from any human
relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological,
7
or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.
In applying for his conscientious objector exemption, Seeger
asserted a "belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for their
own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical creed," but
admitted his "skepticism or disbelief in the existence of God
... II In granting Seeger's exemption the Supreme Court
broadened the interpretation of "Supreme Being" and "religious
training and belief." The Court stated that the test of religious
belief within the meaning of 50 U.S.C., App. section 6(j) is
whether it is "[a] sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in
the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God
of those admittedly qualifiying for the exemption .... "I
However, the Court reaffirmed the limitations on the exemption
contained in the Act, 0 by excluding those whose beliefs were based
essentially on political, sociological or economic considerations
that war is wrong, disavowing religious considerations. The Court
further approved the 1947 Act exclusion of those whose
opposition to war stems from "a merely personal moral code.""
As a result of Seeger, the Selective Service Act of 1967 deleted
2
the concept of belief in a Supreme Being.
5. Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C., App. § 456, 6(j) (1947),
65 Stat. 80, repealed by act Sept. 6, 1966, P.L. 80 Stat. 656.
6. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
7. Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C., App. § 456, 6() (1947),
65 Stat. 80, repealed by act Sept. 6, 1966, P.L. 80 Stat. 656.
8. 380 U.S. at 166.
9. Id.
at 176.
10. 50 U.S.C.. App. § 456(j) (1964). Religious training and belief in this connection
means an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties "superior
to those arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially political,
sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code."
II. See note 10supra.
12. Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C., App. § 4560) (1964), as anended.

SAN DIEGO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 7

In its emphasis upon the sincerity and meaningfulness of the
objector's belief, the Seeger definition appears broad enough to
include the convictions of persons whose beliefs are not religiously
oriented. It was Sisson's contention that he met the breadth of the
definition, in that his belief was held with as much conviction as
the belief of a religious objector. But insofar as Seeger and the
statute required a formal religious basis and did not allow an
objection based upon a personal moral code, Sisson did not
qualify and therefore argued that the requirement invalidly
discriminated against him. Sisson's objection was further
qualified in that he was opposed to training and service in
Vietnam and not to "war in any form" as required by the Act. 3
In this latter respect, the 1967 Act would apply equally to Sisson
and the orthodox objector, who distinguished his religious
opposition in regard to a particular war. Therefore, Sisson's
contentions of unconstitutional discrimination on religious
grounds and the limitations upon his objection will be considered
separately.
The Seeger Court avoided a confrontation of the
constitutionality of the Universal Military Training Act of 1947.
Rather than test the constitutionality of the Act by the first
amendment as Seeger had suggested, the Court found that the Act
was not applied as Congress had intended. The Court was able to
bring Seeger's views within the purview of the statute by expanding the scope of the definition of religious training and belief. Thus,
the Court was able to avoid the constitutional question. However,
as Sisson made no claim to any religiously based belief, the question was unavoidable.
The first amendment of the Constitution provides that:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ... -""These
(Supp. III, 1968). Note that the sentence:
Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual's belief in
a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from
any human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical views or a merely personal code. ...
as found in the 1947 act has been replaced by the following sentence in the 1967 Act: "As
used in this subsection, the term 'religious training and belief' does not include essentially
political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code." The effect
of the Seeger decision was the deletion from the 1967 Act the words "Supreme Being."
13. See note 3supra.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. i.
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two clauses forbid two quite different kinds of governmental
encroachment upon religious freedom. The establishment clause
prohibits the enactment of laws which favor one religion over
others or the religious over the non-believer. 5 The free exercise
clause prohibits enactment of laws which discriminate against
individuals because of their faith or lack of it." Although these
prohibitions appear quite distinct, the decided cases often
interchange the two clauses with the result that cases having
divergent fact situations frequently reach their solution through
the application of the same doctrine.
Thus, in Everson v. Board of Education,'7 the Supreme Court
upheld a New Jersey statute which authorized district boards of
education to make rules and contracts for the transportation of
children to and from school where, by resolution, a board of
education had authorized the reimbursement of parents for fares
paid for transportation by public carriers of children attending
public and parochial schools. The Court held that the statute was
not in violation of the first amendment prohibiting any "law
respecting an establishment of religion." On the contrary,
applying the free exercise clause the Court stated that: "[The
state] cannot exclude individual [religious groups], Non-beliebers,
. . . or the members of any other faith, because of their faith, or
lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare
legislation.' 8 The Everson Court, however, laid no basis for their
determination of the first amendment argument.
The question again arose in the 1960 Supreme Court case of
Torcaso v. Watkins. 9 This decision, unlike Everson, involved the
rights of a non-believer. In Torcaso, the appellant was refused a
commission as a notary public because he would not declare a
belief in God as required by a Maryland statute. In holding the
statute unconstitutional, the Court declared that "neither State
nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person
to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. Neither can
15. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
16. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1960); cf. Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U.S. I (1947).
17. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S.1 (1947).

18. Id. at 17.
19. 367 U.S.488 (1960).

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7

constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all
religions as against non-believers ... "20
The requirement of the 1967 Act that the objection to
military service be religiously based denies to non-believers the
benefit of exemption. This requirement, found in the law enacted
for the common defense, appears to contradict the teaching of
Everson. Moreover, contrary to Torcaso, that requirement forces
Sisson to "profess a belief" in order to qualify for the exemption.
By either approach the statute appears to create an
unconstitutionally discriminatory standard.
The elimination of this discriminatory standard would seem
to effectively rewrite the Constitution to create a "free exercise of
conscience clause." As revolutionary as this step may appear, it
seems already to have been taken as found in the contradictions
inherent in the Seeger decision. At the date of decision Seeger
disavowed any belief in a Supreme Being. The conclusion is
inescapable that his objection to military service was moral in
character and had become entirely personal. The contradiction
appears in the Seeger Court's approval of exclusion of a personal
moral code as grounds for exemption. Furthermore, when
comparing Seeger to Sisson at the date of their respective trials,
it is impossible to discern any relevance in the historic source of
their beliefs. In Sisson, Chief Judge Wyzanski stated the same
conclusion positively when he wrote: "It is not the ancestry but
the authenticity of the sense of duty which creates constitutional
legitimacy." ' 2' Thus it would seem that Sisson was
unconstitutionally discriminated against if he could demonstrate
that his moral code represents a "sincere and meaningful belief
which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that
filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption
"22

Two questions must be asked: Can a "merely moral belief"
occupy the same place in the life of the objector as an orthodox
belief in God holds in the life of one clearly qualified for
exemption? Can one order his life by placing his primary value
20. Id. at 495. "Everson and Torcaso are reasoned from a principle which forbids
preference among religions or between religious and non-religious." 34 U. CHI. L. Rv.
79, 88 (1966).
21. United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 909 (D. Mass. 1969).
22. 380 U.S. at 176.
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system on an essentially "sociological or philosophical" view? To
answer these questions one must look at the strength and priority
of the particular values. Milton Rokeach, in a study of attitudes
and values, stated: "[A] grown person probably has tens of
thousands of beliefs, hundreds of attitudes, but only dozens of
values. A value system is an hierarchical organization-a rank
ordering-of ideals or values in terms of importance." Another
social psychologist added that "[b]oth attitudes and values reside
in the psychological field and define what is expected and desired.
Both can be conceived of as motivational-perceptual states which
' 24
direct behavior.
It is apparent that the strength of the value which is held is
not determined by whether it is based on "religious training" or
some other mode of learning. The determining characteristic is the
particular "rank ordering" in the value hierarchy. The important
factor is the priority of the belief held and not the basis upon
which the belief is held. A "merely moral belief" can and often
does occupy the same place in the life of one person as an
orthodox belief in God holds in the life of another. This argument
has been supported in the writings of social psychologists
regarding value formation and belief structures. Thus, John
Gardner stated:
There are those who think of the meaning of life as resembling
the answer to a riddle. It is a profoundly misleading notion.
The meanings in any life are multiple and varied. Some are
grasped very early, some late; some have a heavy emotional
component, some are strictly intellectual; some merit the label
religious, some are better described as social. But each kind of
meaning implies a relationship between the person and some
larger system of ideas or 25values, a relationship involving
obligation as well as rewards.
That Sisson qualified, based upon these criteria and the
particular facts of his case, was stated by Chief Judge Wyzanski:
Sisson's table of ultimate values is moral and ethical. It
reflects quite as real, pervasive, durable, and commendable a
23.

ROKEACH, M., THE NATURE OF ATTITUDES

0
(1966), p.1 .

24. HOLLANDER, E.P., PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1967),

p.137.
25. Gardner, John W., Individuality. Commitments and Meaning. in CURRENT
89
.
PERSPECTIVES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1967), p.
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marshalling of priorities as a formal religion. It is just as much
a residue of culture, early training, and beliefs shared by
companions and family. What another derives from the
discipline of a church, Sisson derives from the discipline of
26
conscience.
Since Sisson, other courts have reached varying results. In
Welsh v. United States27 the appellant was denied the status of
conscientious objector, because his beliefs were based not on
religious but on moral grounds. In another case, Koster v.
Sharp,8 the court granted a writ of habeas corpus for release from
the military. The petitioner presented arguments similar to those
raised by Sisson; the Court granted the status of conscientious
objector on the basis of Koster's moral belief. It seems possible
to extend the exemption to non-religious objectors insofar as their
belief holds the same place in their life as does an orthodox belief
in the life of one clearly qualified for exemption as a religious
objector. This would limit the exemption to those who were
opposed to war in any form. By limiting the exemption to this
situation, one of the first amendment objections is obviated; nonreligious objectors would no longer be the subjects of
discrimination. The local draft boards would not require that the
belief be based on religious training; they would require only that
such belief is held with equal conviction and sincerity. This would
place no greater burden on the draft board in regard to fact
finding problems than does the determination of the sincerity of
a religious believer.
I.

".

.

. opposed to participationin war in anyform. .

If this is the final determination, however, Sisson has won
only half the battle. In addition to the requirement of a belief
based upon "religious training" which both the Sisson and Koster
courts 29 have agreed can only be grounded upon religious
26. 297 F. Supp. at 905.
27. 404 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1968), appeal granted 38 U.S.L.W. 3113 (1969).
28. Civil No. 69-1242 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 1969). Koster's beliefs were based on nonreligious grounds according to the army's definition of religious training and belief. It
should be noted that thenititary uses the same test as the local board as set out in Seeger.
[T]he regulations [Department of Defense Directive 1300.6, IV. 3(b)]
incorporate by reference statutory standards which govern the determination
of whether a conscientious objector discharge should be granted. These
standards are the same as those used by the Selective Service System in passing
on pre-induction requests for conscientious objector classification.
29. Koster v. Sharp, Civil No. 69-1242 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 1969).
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prejudice, Sisson's objection was to service in Vietnam. In this
respect Sisson and other conscientious objectors are on equal
footing, for the Act required that the objection must be to "war
in any form." The court in Sisson assumed that Congress has the
general power to conscript even in the time of peace; however,
Chief Judge Wyzanski found that this power is not absolute but
is subject to some "exception or immunity" in favor of individual
liberty.30 On the contrary, it has been suggested that exemption
from conscription is entirely dependent upon legislative grace, 31
and that a selective conscientious objector, like Sisson, has no
right to refuse induction because Congress has not seen fit to
provide for him. However, it cannot be doubted that the religious
liberty of a person, who objects to a particular war because of his
faith, would be infringed upon by conscription for service in that
war. It should follow on the same first and fifth amendment
grounds considered in the earlier section that the test of whether
such infringement is justified must also be the same for the nonreligious selective objector.
The Supreme Court has recognized that there may be
situations in which the right to free exercise of religion may
necessarily be infringed. But the Court has stated, in Sherbert v.
Verner,32 that "in this highly sensitive constitutional area, [o]nly
the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give
occasion for permissible limitations. ' 33 In Sherbert, the appellant,
a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church, was denied state
unemployment compensation benefits because she refused to
accept otherwise suitable employment which would have required
her to work on her religion's Sabbath. The Court held that the
state must adopt an alternative form of regulation which
eliminates this infringement, unless it can demonstrate that no
30. 297 F. Supp. at 907.
31. The Court of Military Appeals concluded that "the constitution neither confers
upon, nor preserves to the individual a right to avoid military service because of
compulsions of his conscience." United States v. Noyd, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 483, 490, 40
C.M.R. 195 (1969). in a concurring opinion Judge Ferguson stated that: "It is well settled
that no claim of conscientious objection may be founded on constitutional principles." Id.
at 498. In this case the petitioner was an in-service conscientious objector who, like Sisson,
because of moral beliefs was opposed to involvement in Vietnam.

32. 374 U.S. 398.
33. Id. at 406. "[A]ny attempt to restrict those liberties must be justified by clear
public interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present danger."
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
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alternative form of regulation can accomplish its legislative
purpose without entailing unreasonable cost.34 This holding of the
Supreme Court appears to set forth a viable test of whether the
infringement of first amendment freedom of religion rights is
justified.
Clearly the defense of the nation is an essential and a
paramount interest of Congress and of the people of the United
States. As the Sisson court assumed, without deciding, it seems
indisputable that Congress could "compel the armed service of
any citizen in the land, without regard to his objections or his
views in respect of the justice or morality of the particular war
or of war in general," if the conflict were one which would place
the nation in danger of destruction.35 As the balance of danger
moves away from that point, individual rights may have to be
given consideration.
Alexander Hamilton urged that "[the war] powers ought to
exist without limitations . . . . [N]o constitutional shackles can

wisely be imposed

. .

.,3

upon the Congress in carrying out those

powers. Furthermore, the determination of a selective objector is
based upon the factual deliberation resulting in agreement or
disagreement with our government's foreign policy. To grant this
right would "be tantamount to the substitution of private
judgment for the judgment of public officers entrusted with
carrying out the powers of Government. '37 If such a right is
granted here, by logical extension it would seem that the
individual should have the right to reviev' every act of Congress
to determine, upon his moral belief, whether he will follow that
act or disregard it. However, that right has already been exercised
in cases like Torcaso, Everson and Sherbert, without disastrous
results. More importantly, contrary to Hamilton's urging, it
appears that the first amendment, wisely or not, has imposed
some shackles upon congressional power to conscript civilians for
service in the military.3 1 It seems necessary then, to determine
whether the present military situation and the corresponding
34. 374 U.S. at 407.
35. 297 F. Supp. at 908.
36. THE FEDERALIST No. 23 (Hamilton).
37. United States v. Noyd, 18 U.S.C.M.A.. 483, 493, C.M.R. 195 (1969).
38. Other war powers have been limited by individual rights under the Constitution.
Cf. O'Callahan v. Parker 89 S. Ct. 1683 (1969). Noted in 7 SAN DiLGo L. REv. 55
(1970).
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"gravity of abuse" by refusal to serve are sufficient to override
individual rights.
Judge Wyzanski took a pragmatic approach and found that
under present circumstances there does not appear to be a national
need for combat service from Sisson. "The want of magnitude in
the national demand for combat service is reflected in the nation's
lack of calls for sacrifice in any serious way by civilians. '39 He
also cited the lack of a declaration of war or congressional
proclamation of the existence of a national emergency. In.
addition, Chief Judge Wyzanski pointed out that "a selective
conscientious objector might reflect a more discriminating study
of the problem, a more sensitive conscience and a deeper spiritual
understanding." 40 These considerations were controlling in the
court's determination that the present situation falls short of the
"last extremity," which would permit Congress to "compel the
armed service of any citizen in the land."'" It seems, however, that
consideration by the Sisson court of state and military need for
Sisson and those like him, other than the judicial notice of the
lack of a declaration of war, is an unjustified invasion of other
governmental powers. Although there are presently no established
criteria for determining when there may be a need for Sisson to
serve, there are some possible indicators. As previously indicated,
there has been no formal declaration of war. Moreover, the
Selective Service Act provides for a special classification which
conditionally exempts those persons who because of physical,
mental or moral standards do not qualify for service now, but
would qualify "for such service in time of war or national
emergency declared by the Congress. '"42 The fact that this
classification is presently being utilized is an indicator that no
national emergency exists. Since Congress has not faced the
problem immediately at hand and criteria are needed, these could
justifiably be used, and reach the same result as the Sisson court.
It appears, therefore, that the government must demonstrate
that no alternative form of regulation can accomplish its
39. 297 F. Supp. at 909. "The chief reason for reaching this conclusion after
examining the competing interests is the magnitude of Sisson's interest in not killing in
the Vietnam conflict as against the want of magnitude in the country's present need for
him to be so employed." Id. at 910.
40. Id. at 908.
4 1. Id. at 907.
42. 32 C.F.R. § 1622.17 (1969).
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legislative purpose without entailing unreasonable cost.

3

A

possible alternative seems available in section 456(j) which
provides for substitute service in a capacity which contributes to
the national health, safety and interest. 4 One possible effect of
extending the exemption is that the number of conscientious

objectors during an unpopular war might increase to such a point
that the military would suffer from a manpower loss to the
advantage of projects of national health and safety; eventually

there may be a saturation point at which civilian jobs of the
applicable nature will not be available. However, this is inherently
possible even limited to the present conscientious objector
classification, and this possibility alone should not control; when

the saturation point is reached, that in itself may be sufficient
justification for revocation of exemption. Furthermore, it is better
to have these people working for the national interest in a civilian
capacity than in jail. 5
Two other arguments appear more valid. If exemption from

military service were allowed on a selective basis, it would become
necessary to make a redetermination

of the objector's

classification upon each change in the world situation.
Furthermore, it may be that the selective objector's complaint is
premature. Pearl Harbor taught this nation the necessity of
having trained forces available on short notice. The selective
objector does not resist being trained to fight and serve in the

military generally. A more timely remedy may be a habeas corpus
action in the event of receipt of orders to participate in the
furtherance of the war effort to which he is conscientiously
opposed.
43. See note 34 supra.
44. That section states:
Any person claiming exemption from combatant training and service because
of such conscientious objections whose claim is sustained by the local board
shall, if he is inducted into the armed forces under this title . . . be assigned
to noncombatant service as defined by the President, or shall, if he is found
to be conscientiously opposed to participation in such noncombatant service,
in lieu of such induction, be ordered by his local board, subject to such
regulations as the President may prescribe, to perform a period equal to the
period prescribed in section 4(b) . . . such civilian work contributing to the
maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest. . ..
45. In addition, there appears to be no strong moral basis for not serving in an
alternate capacity. Selective objectors could, therefore, be placed in such positions subject
to induction in the event of a national emergency.
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Whatever the outcome:
The statute as here applied creates a clash between law and
morality for which no exigency exists .

. .

. The law cannot

be adequately enforced by the courts alone, or by courts
supported merely by the police and the military. The true secret
of legal might lies in the habits of conscientious men
disciplining themselves to obey the law they respect without the
necessity of judicial and administrative orders. When the law
treats a reasonable, conscientious act as a crime it subverts its
own power. It invites civil disobedience. It impairs the very
habits which nourish and preserve the law.4 6
SANDOR W. SHAPERY
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Stanley v. Georgia (U.S. 1969).
An investigation into the suspected bookmaking activities of
Robert Eli Stanley led to the issuance of a search warrant by a
United States Commissioner. Under the authority of this warrant,
Stanley's residence was searched. Little evidence of illegal
wagering was discovered, but three reels of motion picture film
were found in a desk drawer in Stanley's bedroom. After the
investigators viewed the films on Stanley's projector, the reels
were seized as contraband obscene matter.' Stanley was arrested,
indicted for possession of obscene matter in violation of Georgia
law, 2 tried and convicted in the Superior Court of Fulton County.
MATRIAL.

The Supreme Court of Georgia3 affirmed the conviction
reasoning that obscenity is not entitled to the protection of the
first amendment under the rule of Roth v. United States4 and that
46. 297 F. Supp. at 910-11.
I. Appellant did not argue that the materials seized were not obscene. Therefore, the
Court assumed, for purposes of decision, that the films would be classified as obscene
matter under any presently accepted test. 394 U.S. at 557 n.2.
2. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6301 (Supp. 1968), which reads in pertinent part, "Any
person . . . who shall knowingly have possession of. . . any obscene matter . . . shall,
if such person has knowledge or reasonably should know of the obscene nature of such
matter, be guilty of a felony ....3. Cf Stanley v. State, 224 Ga. 259, 161 S.E.2d 309, 312 (1968). The exact ground
was not urged until argument before the United States Supreme Court. Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557, 560 (1969).
4. Roth v. United States, Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).

